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ABSTRACT 
Social Change* 
Society is characterized by the common attitudes and behaviour of its 
members. Such behaviour reflects purposive decision making by individuals, 
given the environment they live in. Thus, as technology changes, so might 
social norms. There were big changes in social norms during the 20th 
Century, especially in sexual mores. In 1900 only six percent of unwed 
females engaged in premarital sex. Now, three quarters do. It is argued here 
that this was the result of technological improvement in contraceptives, which 
lowered the cost of premarital sex. The evolution from an abstinent to a 
promiscuous society is studied using an equilibrium-matching model. 
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Why is there so much social change today, and why was there so little in
ancient times? The most probable answer, the result of quite extensive study,
is mechanical invention and scientic discovery. There is no doubt that use-
ful inventions and researches cause social changes. Steam and steel were major
forces in developing our extensive urban life. Gunpowder inuenced the decline
of feudalism. The discovery of seed-planting destroyed the hunting cultures and
brought a radically new form of social life. The automobile is helping to create
the metropolitan community. Small inventions, likewise, have far-reaching ef-
fects. The coin-in-the-slot device changes the range and nature of salesmanship,
radically a¤ects di¤erent businesses, and creates unemployment. The e¤ects of
the invention of contraceptives on population and social institutions is so vast as
to defy human estimation. It is obvious, then, that social changes are caused by
inventions. William F. Ogburn (1936, pp. 1-2)
1 Introduction
What is social change? Dene it simply as shifts in the attitudes and behavior that charac-
terize a society. So, why and how do societies evolve? The idea here is that social change
is largely an adaptation to improvements in a societys technological environment. As a
societys production possibilities improve due to technological advance, it becomes in the
self interest of some of its citizens to modify their behavior to take advantage of the new
circumstances. The number may be small at rst, and the rst adaptors may seem to be
heretics. But, if technological progress continues, more and more of its citizens will follow.
Often attitudes lag behavior. The individuals participating in an activity may not condone
it, as hypocritical as this may seem. What at rst seems abnormal will eventually become
conventional. Social change, then, is simply a shift in the fraction of society ascribing to a
particular attitude or mode of behavior. There may be no better illustration of this phe-
nomena than the change in sexual mores that occurred during the 20th century.
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1.1 The change in sexual mores
In 1900 almost no unmarried teenage girl engaged in premarital sex; only a paltry 6 percent
 see Figure 1.1 By 2002 a large majority (roughly 75 percent) had experienced this.
What caused this: the contraception revolution. Both the technology for contraception and
education about its practice changed dramatically over the course of the last century. Along
with a change in behavior came a change in attitude toward premarital sex. In 1968 only
15 percent of women had a permissive attitude toward premarital sex Figure 2. At the
time, though, about 40 percent of 19 year-old females had experienced it. The number with
a permissive attitude had jumped to 45 percent by 1983, a time when 73 percent of 19 year
olds were sexually experienced. Another reection of the change in sexual mores is the rise
in the number of sexual partners that unmarried females have. For the women born between
1933 and 1942, the majority of those who engaged in premarital sex had only one partner
by age 20, presumably their future husband see Figure 3. By the 1963-1972 cohort, the
majority of these women had at least 2 partners. Notwithstanding the great improvement in
contraception technology and education, the number of out-of-wedlock births to females rose
from 3 percent in 1920 to 33 percent in 1999 Figure 4. Despite great public concern about
teenage sexual behavior in recent years, there has not been any attempt to build formal
models of it. The current work will attempt to ll this void.2
1.2 The Analysis
The rise in premarital sex will be analyzed within the context of an equilibrium matching
model. The model has three salient features. First, when engaging in premarital sex indi-
viduals deliberate the costs and benets from this risky activity. On this, the availability
of contraceptives and abortion will lower the costs of premarital sex, while the presence of
AIDS/HIV raise it. Second, individuals di¤er in their tastes for sex. A person desires a mate
1 The sources for the U.S. data displaced in the gures and tables are detailed in the Appendix, Section
13.5.
2 Restuccia and Urrutia (2004) show that pre-college education is critical for intergenerational transmis-
sion of inequality. Therefore, the lifecycle implications of teenage pregnancies can be high.
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Figure 1: Percentage of 19 year-old females with premarital sexual experience
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Figure 2: Percentage of females with a permissive attitude toward premarital sex
3
Figure 3: Number of partners by age 20 for women engaging in premarital sex, frequency
distribution by birth cohort
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Figure 4: Out-of-wedlock births, percentage
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who is similarly inclined so that they can enjoy the same lifestyle. This leads to a bilateral
search structure, similar in some respects to the marriage model of Aiyagari, Greenwood,
and Guner (2000). Third, given that people desire to nd partners that share their views on
sex, they will pick to circulate within social groups who subscribe to their beliefs. This is the
most e¢ cient way to nd a suitable partner. The membership of social groups is therefore
endogenous. Shifts in the sizes of the groups reect social change.3
It is established theoretically that in the developed matching models steady state the
population sorts very neatly into two social groups. Those who want an abstinent relation-
ship circulate exclusively among people who share the same ideal, while those who prefer
a promiscuous one associate with others who desire the same thing. This does not have to
happen outside of a steady state. It is also shown theoretically that the model is likely to
display rapid transitional dynamics. This is desirable since sexual practice appears to have
responded quite quickly to the availability of new and improved contraception. The model is
solved numerically in order to assess its ability to explain the rise in premarital sex over the
twentieth century. A key step in the simulation is the construction of a time series reecting
the cost of sex. This series is based upon the observed e¤ectiveness and use of various types
of contraception. The framework can replicate well the rapid rise in premarital sex that the
last one hundred years witnessed. In particular, it is found that: (i) the reduction in the
risk of pregnancy due to availability of new and improved contraceptions encouraged the rise
of premarital sex; (ii) increased accessibility to abortion promoted premarital sex; (iii) the
spread of AIDS/HIV dissuaded it.
The search framework developed here has implications that would be harder to examine
using other paradigms. First, the model is able to match both the fraction of teenagers
having sex in a given period as well as the proportion who have had sex by age 19. Likewise,
the model can give predictions on the fraction of teenagers becoming pregnant each period
3 This notion is not without some precedence. For example, Burdett and Coles (1997) illustrate within
the context of a marital search model how people may wed exclusively within their own social class (which
is some range of types). Search is not directed within ones own social class, however. People look over the
entire marriage market. An equilibrium may obtain where individuals choose to reject all potential mates
below their own social class.
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and the proportion who become pregnant by age 19. These two measures would be hard to
disentangle in a static model. Yet, they might have di¤erent relevancies for public policies.
The former might be indicative of the aggregate per-period costs of premarital sex, the latter
a measure of the risk of premarital sex for a teenage girl. Second, the model can match
the median duration of an adolescent relationship and the average number of partners for
sexually active teenagers. In the data there is a huge dispersion across the number of sexual
partners. The current prototype has di¢ culty matching this, but future versions might
be able to do so. Third, the current model can shed light on the trends and magnitudes
of teenage pregnancies. Fourth, it is shown how a simple modication of the framework
captures the observed rise in the frequency of sex. Last, a future version of the framework
could be used to model the spread of a sexually transmitted disease. The adjustment of
individual behavior to the risk of the infection, and to prophylaxes that change the risk,
may important for understanding its transmission.
There are other ways to approach social change. Cole, Mailath, and Postelwaite (1992)
model the notion of social norms. Historically, societies have had conventions governing
premarital sex, such as making it taboo. Individuals engaging in premarital sex may be
outcast or shunned by other members of society. Given this fact most individuals may
rationally choose to subscribe to the social norm and remain abstinent when young. Such
an idea does not conict with the current analysis. As a societys consumption possibilities
change due to technological progress it may become increasingly impossible to sustain such
a norm. There is some evidence that social norms may change slowly. Fernandez and Fogli
(2005) examine, using 1970 Census data, the fertility and labor-force participation rates for
American born women whose parents were immigrants. They nd that the fertility and
labor-force participation rates in the country of ancestry have signicant explanatory power
for these American womens fertility and work behavior. These ancestral e¤ects reect
di¤erences in attitudes or social norms about a womens role in society.
It is also possible to model social change via shifts in preferences over time. This would
be in the spirit of Doepke and Zilibotti (2004) and Fernandez, Fogli, and Olivetti (2004).
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For example, suppose parents inuence the preferences of their o¤spring. Parents who were
promiscuous when young might endow their o¤spring with less negative attitudes toward
premarital sex than parents who were abstinent when young. Again, this is not at odds
with the current analysis. Such a preference channel adds momentum to the technological
one. Technological advance in contraception could operate to entice some youths to engage
in premarital sex, who in turn will have o¤spring that will be even more predisposed toward
it. The number of children in society who are inclined toward premarital sex will therefore
increase magnifying the impact of the original, and also subsequent, technological progress.
2 Environment
Suppose that there are two social classes in society, one whose members are abstinent,
the other whose members are promiscuous. Members in a social class circulate amongst
themselves. Each class is a separate world, so to speak, but the members of a particular
class are free to switch to the other class at any time. Social change will be measured by
the shift in membership between the two classes.
Each member of society is indexed by the variable s 2 S = fs1; s2;    ; sng, which
represents their joy from sex. The value of s is known by an individual. Let s be distributed
across individuals according to the density function S(sj) = j, with 0 < j < 1,
Pn
j=1 j =
1, and s1 < s2 <    < sn. Suppose that time ows discretely. At the beginning of each
period, an unattached member in a class will match with another single individual in the
same class with probability . The partners type will be randomly determined in accordance
with the type distribution prevailing at that time within the class. This couple must then
make two intertwined decisions: whether or not to stay together for the period, and which
social class to join. If they choose not to stay together, then they must wait until the next
period for another opportunity to match. With probability 1  an unattached person fails
to match with another single one. These individuals just decide upon which social class to
join. This will inuence the type of mate that they might draw next period.
Similarly, at the beginning of each period, matches in each class from the previous period
7
break up with probability . Couples in the surviving matches must also make two inex-
tricably linked decisions; to wit, whether or not to remain together and which social class
to join. If they choose to break up then they must wait until the next period for another
matching opportunity. Like single agents who fail to match, couples whose relationships
break up exogenously just decide upon which social class to join.
Let a matched person in the abstinence class enjoy a level of momentary utility of u, and
a single person realize a momentary utility level of v, with u > v. A matched person in the
promiscuity class realizes a momentary utility level of u+ s  , where s is the joy from sex
and  is the expected cost of sex say due to an out-of-wedlock birth or a sexually transmitted
disease. Note that  cant represent a stigma e¤ect since this is really an attitude. Change
in attitudes and behavior are what is being modelled here. An unmatched person in this
class attains a utility of v. Individuals discount next periods utility by the factor . Assume
that u, v, s, and  are specied in a way that guarantees that expected lifetime utility is
always positive.
To complete the setup, some structure will be placed on the population. First, the size
of the population will be normalized to one. Second, each period a fraction 1    of the
population will move on to another phase of life, which will be interpreted as adulthood.
This latter phase of life will be taken to be a facsimile of their current life, but in a di¤erent
location. These people are selected at random and are replenished by an equal ow of young
unmatched individuals. Let couples relocate together. So, assume that each single, and each
couple, face a relocation probability of 1  .4
The idea is that over time the cost of premarital sex,  , declines due to technological
progress in contraception and improvements in birth control education. As a consequence,
4 Making an adults world look like a teenagers one requires some additional assumptions. First, suppose
that adults survive with probability 2   1. Second, assume that some new unmatched adults ow in from
another source at rate 1   ; i.e., there is a ow in of unmatched adults who somehow missed teenage life.
These two assumptions ensure that an adults world will have the same type distributions as the teenagers
one. Third, when adults die assume that they realize a utility level of zero from then. Fourth, set the
discount factor for an adult, e, so that e = =[2   1]. The last two assumptions guarantee that the adults
programming problem will be a copy of the teenagers one, even though the former faces death. These
assumptions are made to ensure logical consistency, not realism.
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people move out of the abstinence class, A, into the promiscuity class, P. The situation is
portrayed in Figure 5, by the arrow moving left to right. As will be seen, there may also
be some secondary movement from P to A. For example, some people may choose to live a
promiscuous lifestyle rather than lose their partner. When one of these matches breaks up,
one individual may move back to A.
3 Decision Problems
Let A(s; es) denote the expected lifetime utility for an individual of type s who is currently
in an abstinent match with a partner of type es. While abstinent an individual does not
experience any joy from sex. But, s/he could in the future. Thus, A should still be a
function of s. Also, an individuals joy from sex does not depend directly upon his partners
type, es. Still, he cares indirectly about es because this will delimit his future matching
possibilities, as will be seen. Next, dene B(s) to be the expected lifetime utility for an
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unmatched agent in class A. Turn now to the promiscuous class. Here P (s; es) will represent
the expected lifetime utility for individual s who is currently in a promiscuous match withes, and Q(s) will proxy for the expected lifetime utility for an unmatched agent in class P.
Finally, suppose that s and es meet. What will be the outcome of this meeting? Let X(s; es)
be the equilibrium probability that an abstinent relationship will occur, Y (s; es) denote the
odds that a promiscuous one transpires, and Z(s; es) give the chance that no match will
ensue.
3.1 The Abstinence Class, A
Suppose person s is matched with es in A. The recursion dening the value of this match for
s, or the function A(s; es), is given by
A(s; es) = u+ (1  )[X 0(s; es)A0(s; es) + Y 0(s; es)P 0(s; es)]
+[ + (1  )Z 0(s; es)]maxfB0(s); Q0(s)g; (1)
where in standard fashion a prime attached to a variable denotes its value next period. The
rst term on the righthand side is the momentary utility realized today from an abstinent
match, u. The rest of the terms give the discounted value of the lifetime utility that s can
expect from tomorrow on. Note that his current match with es will survive into next period
with probability (1 ).5 At this time the couple can decide to remain together in an absti-
nent relationship, switch to a promiscuous one, or break up. Recall that the functionX 0(s; es)
reports the equilibrium probability that an abstinent match between s and es will occur next
period.6 Thus, the term (1   )X 0(s; es)A0(s; es) represents the component of expected life-
time utility from next period on that is associated with the possibility of an abstinent match
5 Note that the pair, s and es, will move to a new location next period with probability 1   . But, by
assumption ss life will continue on in indentical fashion there, since the new location is an exact copy of the
old one. Thus, there is no need to incorporate this survival probability into the recursion. As will be seen,
though, it will enter into the laws of motion for the type distributions.
6 As will be seen, these probabilities must be determined in equilibrium as a function of ones partners
decisions. It is this factor that distinguishes a bilateral search from the standard one, as typied by the
job-search models of Andolfatto and Gomme (1996) or Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992)
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then. Likewise, the part of expected lifetime utility linked to a promiscuous match is given
by (1  )Y 0(s; es)P 0(s; es). Now a match may not occur next period because the pair breaks
up, either exogenously or endogenously. A match breaks up exogenously with probability ,
and endogenously with probability (1   )Z 0(s; es), where Z 0(s; es)  1  X 0(s; es)   Y 0(s; es).
When the match breaks up person s must decide whether to enjoy his single life in either
the abstinent or promiscuous class. The term [ + (1   )Z 0(s; es)]maxfB0(s); Q0(s)g gives
the part of expected lifetime utility that is associated with single life next period. When
single at that time person s will choose to join the social class (A or P) that maximizes
expected lifetime utility so that he will realize the level of bliss given by maxfB0(s); Q0(s)g.
The determination of the functions X and Y is discussed below. They will be predicated
upon the preferences that each party in the match has toward a relationship, if they desire
one at all. Last, note that time is implicitly a state variable in the above recursion, since
the costs of premarital sex will be changing over time in a manner to be specied later.
Alternatively, consider the case where s is alone in A. His expected lifetime utility is
given by the function B(s), which reads
B(s) = v + 
nX
j=1
0j[X
0(s; esj)A0(s; esj) + Y 0(s; esj)P 0(s; esj)]
+ [(1  ) + 
nX
j=1
0jZ
0(s; esj)]maxfB0(s); Q0(s)g: (2)
Note that ss draw for a partner, es, next period will depend upon the type distribution for
unmatched agents that will prevail in A at that time. This type distribution is given by the
0js, with 0  0j  1 and
Pn
j=1 
0
j = 1. Its determination is detailed later.
3.2 The Promiscuity Class, P
When person s matches with es in the promiscuity class he will realize an expected lifetime
utility level of
P (s; es) = u+ s   + (1  )[X 0(s; es)A0(s; es) + Y 0(s; es)P 0(s; es)]
+[ + (1  )Z 0(s; es)]maxfB0(s); Q0(s)g: (3)
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In the above problem the individual experiences a joy from sex, net of costs, in the amount
s   . Unmatched person s will attain
Q(s) = v + 
nX
j=1
$0j[X
0(s; esj)A0(s; esj) + Y 0(s; esj)P 0(s; esj)]
+ [(1  ) + 
nX
j=1
$0jZ
0(s; esj)]maxfB0(s); Q0(s)g: (4)
Note that ss draw for a partner next period will depend upon the type distribution for
unmatched agents that will prevail in P at that time, or the $0js with 0  $0j  1 andPn
j=1$
0
j = 1.
3.3 Social Class Membership Decision
Now, consider individual s who is matched with partner es. An abstinent match with es may
be individual ss rst choice. Let the indicator H(s; es) return a value of one if this is the
case, and a value of zero otherwise. The indicator function H(es; s) is then given by
H(s; es) =
8<: 1; if A(s; es) > maxfB(s); P (s; es); Q(s)g (abstinent match is rst choice);0; otherwise.
(5)
Observe that the analogous indicator function for person es will simply read H(es; s) =
HT (s; es), where the superscript T denotes the transpose of a matrix. Now, it may be the
case that person s would prefer a promiscuous match with es, but this isnt feasible. Still, s
may prefer to live with es in A, relative to living alone in either A or P. Let the indicator
function I(s; es) return a value of one if s prefers a match with es in A, relative to single life
in either A or P, and a value of zero otherwise. Thus, I(s; es) is given by
I(s; es) =
8<: 1; if A(s; es) > maxfB(s); Q(s)g (abstinent match preferred to single life);0; otherwise.
(6)
Person ss preferences towards promiscuous matches can be analyzed in similar fashion.
To this end, let the indicator function J(s; es) return a value of one if s would prefer to live
12
with es in P over all other options, and a value of zero otherwise. This indicator function is
dened by
J(s; es) =
8<: 1; if P (s; es) > maxfA(s; es); B(s); Q(s)g (promiscuous match is rst choice),0; otherwise.
(7)
The situation where s prefers to live with es in P, relative to living alone in either A or P,
can be captured by the indicator function K(s; es):
K(s; es) =
8<: 1; if P (s; es) > maxfB(s); Q(s)g (promiscuous match preferred to single life);0; otherwise.
(8)
Consider an unmatched agent. S/he must choose between searching for a prospective
mate in the abstinent or promiscuous class. Let L(s) denote the decision rule for an un-
matched individual. In particular,
L(s) =
8<: 1; if B(s) > Q(s), (single in A preferred to single in P),0; otherwise. (9)
Suppose that s and es have met, either through a new or pre-existing match. The proba-
bilities of abstinent or promiscuous relationships, X(s; es) and Y (s; es), occurring can now be
constructed. In particular,
X(s; es) = H(s; es)HT (s; es) +H(s; es)K(s; es)JT (s; es)IT (s; es)=2
+HT (s; es)KT (s; es)J(s; es)I(s; es)=2
+H(s; es)[1 K(s; es)][1 HT (s; es)]IT (s; es)
+HT (s; es)[1 KT (s; es)][1 H(s; es)]I(s; es); (10)
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and
Y (s; es) = J(s; es)JT (s; es) +H(s; es)K(s; es)JT (s; es)IT (s; es)=2
+HT (s; es)KT (s; es)J(s; es)I(s; es)=2
+[1  J(s; es)]K(s; es)JT (s; es)[1  IT (s; es)]
+[1  JT (s; es)]KT (s; es)J(s; es)[1  I(s; es)]: (11)
Take the expression for X(s; es). It is not as formidable as it looks. The rst term gives
the situation where an abstinent match is both ss and ess rst choice. When this occurs
H(s; es)HT (s; es) = 1. The remaining terms enumerate situations where an abstinent match
is not one persons rst choice for a match, but they still prefer it to single life.
Consider the second term. Suppose that person ss rst choice is an abstinent relation-
ship, but she would be willing to accept a promiscuous one as opposed to being single. In
this circumstance H(s; es)K(s; es) = 1, and is zero otherwise. Additionally, suppose that her
partner wants a promiscuous match the most, but prefers an abstinent relationship to single
life. Here, JT (s; es)IT (s; es) = 1. How will the couple resolve this di¤erence in tastes? Simply
assume that they just ip a coin between the two alternatives. The odds of an abstinent
match are then H(s; es)K(s; es)JT (s; es)IT (s; es)=2 = 1=2 . This expression will return a value
of zero in any other circumstance. The third term just reports the situation when the roles
for s and es are reversed. Therefore, when two people s and es have the above-mentioned
di¤erence in tastes, half of the time the match will be resolved in ss favor, while the other
half it will be decided to ess benet. (This is also true on average within a given match over
time.) In a more general model, one of the parties may want to transfer some resources to the
other via some mechanism, say Nash bargaining, in order to attain what they desire. Here
matches would be e¢ cient. In lieu of this possibility, the above lottery scheme reconciles the
di¤erence in tastes about as best as can be done.
The fourth term gives the situation where person s will refuse a promiscuous match. If
ss rst choice is an abstinent match, and shell refuse a promiscuous one, then H(s; es)[1 
K(s; es)] = 1. Likewise, when ess best option is a promiscuous match, but hell accept an
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abstinent one, then [1   HT (s; es)]IT (s; es) = 1. The odds of an abstinent match in this
situation are given by H(s; es)[1   K(s; es)][1   HT (s; es)]IT (s; es) = 1. Again, it is easy to
deduce that this expression will be zero in any other situation. The roles between s and es
are reversed in the fth term. Note that by construction all of the terms in (10) are mutually
exclusive and that X(s; es) 2 f0; 1=2; 1g. Likewise, Y (s; es) 2 f0; 1=2; 1g. Last the odds of no
relationship are just simply given by
Z(s; es)  1 X(s; es)  Y (s; es); (12)
where Z(s; es) 2 f0; 1g.
Observe that equations (1) to (12) jointly determine a solution for the value functions
A(s; es), B(s), P (s; es), Q(s), the decision rules H(s; es) , I(s; es),    , L(s), and the matching
functions, X(s; es), Y (s; es), and Z(s; es), contingent upon the type distributions of unmatched
agents in A and P, or the js and $js.
4 Laws of Motion for the Type Distributions
Computing a solution to the model involves calculating the time paths for the type distrib-
utions of unmatched agents in A and P. The solutions to the recursions (2) and (4) depend
directly upon these distributions the js and $js. Note these distributions will indirectly
inuence (1) and (3) as well. Hence, the equilibrium social class membership functions (9)
to (12) will depend upon these distributions. And as will be seen, these distributions will
be functions of these membership decisions. Thus, a xed-point problem arises.
To this end, let M(s; es) denote the nonnormalized distribution over matched pairs in
A and U(s) denote the analogous (nonnormalized) distribution over singles. Therefore,
 =
Pn
i=1
Pn
j=1M(si; esj) gives the number of attached agents in A, while similarly  =Pn
i=1 U(si) is the number of unattached ones. Thus, j = U(sj)=. Likewise, N(s; es) and
V (s) will represent the distributions for matched and unmatched agents in P. Represent
the number of unattached people in P by # = Pni=1 V (si). Therefore, $j = V (sj)=#. The
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laws of motion for M(s; es), U(s), N(s; es) and V (s) are given by
M 0(s; es) = (1  )X(s; es)M(s; es) + (1  )X(s; es)N(s; es)
+ X(s; es)U(s)U(es)=2 + #X(s; es)V (s)V (es)=#2; (13)
U 0(s) = (1  )L(s)U(s) + (1  )L(s)V (s) + (1  )L(s)S(s)
+ 
X
m
L(s)Z(s; esm)U(s)U(esm)=2
+ 
X
m
#L(s)Z(s; esm)V (s)V (esm)=#2
+ 
X
m
L(s)[ + (1  )Z(s; esm)]M(s; esm)
+ 
X
m
L(s)[ + (1  )Z(s; esm)]N(s; esm); (14)
V 0(s) = (1  )[1  L(s)]U(s) + (1  )[1  L(s)]V (s) + (1  )[1  L(s)]S(s)
+ 
X
m
[1  L(s)]Z(s; esm)U(s)U(esm)=2
+ 
X
m
#[1  L(s)]Z(s; esm)V (s)V (esm)=#2
+ 
X
m
[1  L(s)][ + (1  )Z(s; esm)]M(s; esm)
+ 
X
m
[1  L(s)][ + (1  )Z(s; esm)]N(s; esm); (15)
and
N 0(s; es) = (1  )Y (s; es)M(s; es) + (1  )Y (s; es)N(s; es)
+Y (s; es)U(s)U(es)=2 + #Y (s; es)V (s)V (es)=#2: (16)
Take the law of motion forM , as given by (13). The rst term represents those currently
attached pairs in A who choose to remain attached there next period. Specically, there
are (1   )M(s; es) surviving matched pairs of type (s; es). Of these the fraction X(s; es) 2
f0; 1=2; 1g agree to be matched in A, as opposed to either matching in P or each party going
16
it alone. The second term in (13) calculates the number of currently matched pairs in P
who will enter into A next period. Next, consider the todays pool of single agents in A.
From this pool there will be U(s)U(es)=2 matches of type (s; es). Out of these pairs the
fraction X(s; es) will agree to an abstinent match. This explains the third term. The fourth
term calculates the number of abstinent matches tomorrow that arise from todays pool of
singles in P.
Next, examine (14), or the law of motion for U . The rst term represents those who
are currently unattached in A and choose to remain there for next period [i.e., L(s) = 1
in line with (9)]. Some people who are unattached in P may choose to move to A. The
number of such people is given by the second term. The third term calculates the number
of new unattached teenagers who search for a mate in the abstinent class next period. The
remaining terms count the number of failed matches between person s and a prospective
partner es , where s decides to search next period for a new mate in A [implying L(s) = 1].
Sometimes two singles, s and es, may meet in either A or P and one of the parties wont
want to match the fourth term for A and the fth for P. Other times an existing abstinent
match may breakup either exogenously or endogenously the sixth term. The same could be
true for promiscuous match the seventh term. The other laws of motion can be explained
in similar manner.
5 Equilibrium
Its time to specify more precisely what will constitute an equilibrium for the above economy.
Denition For a given time path describing the costs of premarital sex, f tg1t=1, and some
initial type distributions, M1(s; es), N1(s; es), U1(s), and V1(s), an equilibrium is represented
by time paths for the value functions,fAt(s; es)g1t=1, fBt(s)g1t=1, fPt(s; es)g1t=1, and fQt(s)g1t=1,
the decision rules, fHt(s; es)g1t=1, fIt(s; es)g1t=1, fJt(s; es)g1t=1, fKt(s; es)g1t=1, and fLt(s)g1t=1,
the matching functions, fXt(s; es)g1t=1, fYt(s; es)g1t=1, and fZt(s; es)g1t=1, and the type distrib-
utions, fMt(s; es)g1t=1, fNt(s; es)g1t=1, fUt(s)g1t=1, and fVt(s)g1t=1, such that:
1. The sequence of value functions, fAt(s; es)g1t=1, fBt(s)g1t=1, fPt(s; es)g1t=1, and fQt(s)g1t=1,
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solve the recursions (1) to (4), given the time paths for the social class decision rule for
singles, fLt(s)g1t=1, the matching functions for couples, fXt(s; es)g1t=1, fYt(s; es)g1t=1, and
fZt(s; es)g1t=1, and the type distributions for singles, fUt(s)g1t=1, and fUt(s)g1t=1. [Recall
that j;t = Ut(sj)=t and$j;t = Vt(sj)=#t with t =
Pn
i=1 Ut(si) and #t =
Pn
i=1 Vt(si).]
2. The sequence of decisions rules and matching functions fHt(s; es)g1t=1, fIt(s; es)g1t=1,
fJt(s; es)g1t=1, fKt(s; es)g1t=1, fLt(s)g1t=1, fXt(s; es)g1t=1, fYt(s; es)g1t=1, and fZt(s; es)g1t=1,
satisfy (5) to (12), given the time paths for the value functions, fAt(s; es)g1t=1, fBt(s)g1t=1,
fPt(s; es)g1t=1, and fQt(s)g1t=1 and the type distributions for singles, fUt(s)g1t=1, and
fVt(s)g1t=1. (Recall the superscript T denotes the transpose of a matrix.)
3. The sequence for the type distributions, fMt(s; es)g1t=1, fNt(s,es)g1t=1, fUt(s)g1t=1, and
fVt(s)g1t=1, solve (13) to (16), given the social class decision rule for singles, fLt(s)g1t=1,
and the matching functions, fXt(s; es)g1t=1, fYt(s; es)g1t=1, and fZt(s; es)g1t=1.
At a general level not much more can be said about the properties of the economys equi-
librium. Some insight into the model, however, can be gleaned by undertaking the following
three tasks in turn. First, the solution to the models steady state will be examined. Second,
the transitional dynamics for the model will be fully characterized for the special case of a
once-and-for-all change in  . Third, the solution to the above equilibrium will be computed
numerically in order to speak to the issue at hand, the change in sexual mores for the al-
gorithm see the Appendix, Section 13.4. After all, the question of whether or not the above
framework is capable of explaining the change in sexual mores is quantitative in nature.
6 Steady-State Analysis
Suppose that  is constant over time. What would a steady state for the above model
look like? It seems reasonable to conjecture that those who enjoy sex, relatively speaking,
will circulate within the promiscuous class, and those who dont, wont. To pursue this
conjecture, suppose that there exists some threshold type, sc, such that fs1;    ; scg 2 A
and fsc+1;    ; sng 2 P. In fact, one might suspect that sc <  < sc+1; that is, those
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who have a joy for sex that is higher than its expected cost will be a member of P, and
those who dont will associate with people in A. (To simplify the analysis, without any real
loss of generality, always suppose that  lies strictly between two ss.) If this conjecture
is true, then a partners type in each class wont matter since the world is split into two
noncommunicating social groups. That is, anyone in A will be willing to accept an abstinent
match with anybody else in A, while all individuals in P will take a promiscuous relationship
with any other person in P.
Lemma 1 There exists a steady-state equilibrium such that sj 2 A for all sj <  , and sj 2
P for sj >  .
Proof. See the Appendix, Section 13.1.
Given the above lemma, there exists a steady state where there is a dividing line in the
s distribution between the two classes given by  . Individuals with a s <  choose to live
abstinent lives, and those with a s >  promiscuous ones. Hence, the (nonnormalized) type
distributions in A and P will be given by f1;    ; c; 0;    ; 0g and f0;    ; 0; c+1;    ; ng,
where c solves
sc <  < sc+1: (17)
The number of people circulating in A is Pcj=1 j, so that the size of the population in P
is given by
#P = 1 
cX
j=1
j: (18)
In a steady state the fraction of people who are attached in either class A or P will be given
by
 =

1  (1  ) + ; (19)
so that the fraction who are unattached is
1   = 1  (1  )
1  (1  ) +  .
Note that  does not depend upon the properties of the type distribution or on the shape
of S(s). This is also true for any other statistic describing the steady-state properties of
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matching within a class. Last, note that the size of the promiscuous class in a steady-state
is a nonincreasing function of the cost of premarital sex, as the following lemma states.
Lemma 2 The steady-state number of people engaging in premarital sex (weakly) increases
with a fall in the cost of premarital sex.
Proof. As  decreases the c that solves (17) will fall, given that s1 < s2 <    < sn. The
result then follows from (18).
7 Transitional Dynamics
7.1 The Impact of a Once-and-for-All Decline in  
As an aid toward gaining some understanding about how the transitional dynamics for
the model work, consider the impact of a once-and-for-all decline in  from  to  . In
particular, suppose that the economy is initially resting in a steady state associated with
 =  . In line with the analysis of Section 6, there will exist a c such that sc <  < sc+1.
The type distribution in A will be given by f1;    ; c; 0;    ; 0g, and the one in P by
f0;    ; 0; c+1;    ; ng. In each class the fraction , as specied by (19), of the populace
will be matched. Suppose that  suddenly drops to  , and stays at that value forever
after. Then, there will be new steady-state type distributions in A and P represented by
f1;    ; d; 0;    ; 0g and f0;    ; 0; d+1;    ; ng, where sd <  < sd+1 assume a large
enough shift in  so that d < c.
Now, think about the following process of convergence between the two steady states,
which will be veried later:
1. To begin with, take an attached (s; es) pair in A in the old steady state. If (s; es) 2
fsd+1;    ; scg  fsd+1;    ; scg they will move immediately to P. Simply put, why
should these individuals wait? There will be 
Pc
j=d+1
Pc
k=d+1 j ek agents in this
category, where  is given by (19). Since the adjustment here is immediate, this case
is a force for rapid transitional dynamics.
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2. Likewise, consider unattached individuals in A. If s 2 fsd+1;    ; scg they too will
immediately enter P. Again, what would be the advantage to waiting? There are (1 
)
Pc
j=d+1 j such agents. Thus, the models transitional dynamics will be very fast on
this account. Note that this implies that the one-step-ahead unmatched type distribu-
tions inA andP will have the forms f01;    ; 0d; 0;    ; 0g and f0;    ; 0; $0d+1;    ; $0ng.
By employing similar reasoning, it can be deduced that this latter feature will hold
along all points of the transition path.
3. There may be matches in the old steady state for which s 2 fs1;    ; sdg and es 2
fsd+1;    ; scg, yet it remains optimal for (s; es) to stay attached in A. Here person ess
type is not high enough to warrant breaking up a relationship with s and searching
by himself in P. There are two types of situations here. Those where person s is
willing to engage in a mixing relationship [X(s; es) = 1=2], and those where she isnt
[X(s; es) = 1]. There will be Pdj=1Pck=d+1X(sj; esk)j ek people in this situation.
The survival rate for these matches is (1 ). The ess who are still around will switch
to P after a breakup.
4. Likewise, there may be matches in the old steady state for which s 2 fs1;    ; sdg andes 2 fsd+1;    ; scg where it is optimal for (s; es) to move to P. Here individual ss unfa-
vorable view of the net gain from sex with es is not bad enough to justify terminating her
relationship with es and searching alone in A. There will be Pdj=1Pck=d+1 Y (sj; esk)jek agents in this position. The survival rate for these matches is (1 ). The surviving
ss will enter A after a breakup.
5. Finally, there may be some matches (s; es) 2 fs1;    ; sdg  fsd+1;    ; scg in the old
steady state for which it is optimal for the couple to break up. Here, person s will search
for a new mate in A while es will look in P. There will be Pdj=1Pck=d+1 Z(sj; esk)jek agents in this case. Since the adjustment here is immediate, this case speaks for
rapid transitional dynamics.
The above line of reasoning suggests that the lemma below should hold the above logic
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is veried during the course of the proof.
Lemma 3 Upon a once-and-for-all decrease in  , the (nonnormalized) type distribution in
A immediately jumps from
f1;    ; c; 0;    ; 0g
to
f1   
Pc
k=d+1 Y (s1; esk)1ek;    ; d   Pck=d+1 Y (sd; esk)dek;

Pd
i=1X(si; esd+1)ied+1;    ; Pdi=1X(si; esc)iec; 0;    ; 0g;
where d < c. The j-step-ahead type distribution in A (for j  1) is given by
f1   [(1  )]j
Pc
k=d+1 Y (s1; esk)1ek;    ; d   [(1  )]jPck=d+1 Y (sd; esk)dek;
[(1  )]jPdi=1X(si; esd+1)ied+1;    ; [(1  )]jPdi=1X(si; esc)iec; 0;    ; 0g: (20)
Proof. See the Appendix, Section 13.2.
To summarize, following a once-and-for-all decline in  some matched couples will immedi-
ately move from A to P. Sometimes one member might move somewhat reluctantly, in the
sense that they would prefer a match in A rather than P. This ideal situation isnt on the
table, because their partner prefers a relationship in P. Over time these matches will break
up exogenously and the (surviving) low-s partner will return toA this explains the right-to-
left arrow in Figure 5. These matches are captured by the [(1  )]jPck=d+1 Y (si; esk)iek
terms (for i = 1;    ; d) in (20). Similarly, some matched individuals will remain in A be-
cause their partner refuses to have a promiscuous match. These high-es individuals will drift
into P as their matches break up, so long as they survive. The [(1 )]jPdi=1X(si; esk)iek
terms (for k = d+ 1;    ; c) represent this situation.
It is readily apparent from (20) that the model will generate rapid transitional dynamics
when  is large or  is small; that is, when matches break up quickly or when teenage life is
short. Last, there is a special case where the number of abstinent and promiscuous matches
jump immediately to their new steady-state values. This is established in the corollary
below. This happens when all the matches discussed in Points 3 and 4 involve mixing
[X(s; es) = Y (s; es) = 1=2]. Note that while at the aggregate level the number of people
engaged in abstinent and promiscuous relationships is constant over time, at the micro level
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there is still movement between social classes that dampens out in line with (20). In this
case, at the micro level the ows into and out of the two social classes balance each other
exactly, as is made clear in the proof of the corollary.
Corollary 1 Suppose that for all matched pairs (s; es) with s < and es > it is optimal to
mix; i.e., assume that X(s; es) = Y (s; es) = 1=2 for all s < and es > . Then, #At =Pdi=1 i
and #Pt =
Pn
i=d+1 i for all t.
Proof. Take all matched pairs of a particular type (s; es) with s < and es > . By the
mixing condition, half of the matches will be in At, the other half in Pt. Now, every period
 of the surviving matches will breakup in each set. Individuals of type s will go to At+1
while those of type es will move to Pt+1. Since for every breakup in At there is one in Pt, the
number of individuals in A and P will not change over time.
Return now to the issue under study, the rise in premarital sex over the last century. In
order to analyze this issue something must be inputted into the simulation for the time path
of costs that governs premarital sex, f tg1t=1. Turn to this subject now.
8 Technological Progress in Contraception
In 1900 engaging in premarital sex was a very risky business. Roughly 71 percent of fe-
males would have gotten pregnant. These odds had dropped to 28 percent by 2002. The
reduction in the chance of pregnancy occurred for two reasons: technological improvement in
contraceptives, and the dissemination of knowledge about contraception and reproduction.
8.1 A Brief History
Coitus interruptus has been practiced since ancient times, and is mentioned in the Bible.7
This was the most important method of contraception historically. The condom has a long
history. In the 18th century, Casanova reported using the English riding coat.Handbills
were circulated in England advertising condoms. One said [for a picture see Himes (1963, p.
198)]:
7 This history is compiled from Himes (1964), McLaren (1990), and Potts and Campbell (2002).
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To guard yourself from shame or fear,
Votaries to Venus, haften here;
None in my wares ever found a aw,
Self preservations natures law.
Early condoms were used more to prevent venereal disease than pregnancy. They were
expensive and uncomfortable. The di¤usion of condoms was promoted by the vulcanization
of rubber in 1843-1844. They were still expensive in 1850, selling for $5 a dozen [McLaren
(1990, p. 184)], which translates into $34 a dozen relative to todays real wages. So, even
when washed and reused, they were too expensive for the masses to use. Another major
innovation was introduction of the latex condom in the 1930s, which dramatically reduced
cost and increased quality. Other methods of birth control were also used, such as a variety
of intrauterine devices. Casanova mentions using half of a lemon as a contraceptive device.
This could have been quite e¤ective since it acted as barrier-cum-spermicidal agent. In 1797
Bentham advocated the use of the sponge to keep down the size of the poor population.
The rubber diaphragm entered service around 1890. It was expensive and had to be t by
a doctor. This limited its use to those who were relatively well o¤. The pill emblematizes
modern contraception. In 1960 the Food and Drug Administration approved the use of it,
which was a remarkable scientic achievement involving the synthesis of a hormone designed
to fool the reproductive system.
The dissemination of knowledge about contraception and reproduction was also very im-
portant. Scientic knowledge about reproduction began to arise in the 19th century. Van
Baer discovered mammalian ovum in 1827. Around the same time, the birth control move-
ment in America started with the works of Robert Dale Owen and Dr. Charles Knowlton.
Owen published the rst book on birth control, Moral Physiology, in 1830. He suggested
coitus interruptus as the best means of contraception. In 1833 Knowlton published Fruits
of Philosophy, which ultimately had more inuence. He advocated douching since there is
(n)o doubt a very small quantity of semen lodged anywhere within the vagina or within
the vulva, may cause conception, if it should escape the inuence of cold, or some chemical
agentas quoted by Himes (1963, p. 228). He gave some rough prescriptions for douching
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agents. Knowlton was prosecuted for obscenity. Scientic knowledge continued to progress,
with Newport describing the fertility cycle of frogs in 1853. In 1873 a law was passed under
the urging of Anthony Comstock banning the communication, via mail, of any information
about contraception or abortion. The next year the U.S. Post O¢ ce seized 60,000 rubber
articles and 3,000 boxes of pills.
The modern birth control movement started about 1914 when Margaret Sanger pub-
lished a pamphlet, Family Limitation, for which she was prosecuted. It described the use
of condoms, douching and suppositories. She became a tireless crusader for birth control
clinics. She opened the rst clinic in 1919. Nine days later the police came. The rst
continually e¤ective birth control clinic was operational in 1923, according to Himes (1963).
Sanger promoted the use of the diaphragm through the clinics. Human ovum were seen for
the rst time in 1930. An accurate tracking of the ovulaton cycle was also attained in the
1930s, making the safe period method a little safer. At more than 70 years of age, Sanger
persuaded a wealthy philanthropist in 1952 to donate $116,000 toward the development of
the pill.
8.2 The E¤ectiveness and Use of Contraception
The use of various methods of contraception during premarital intercourse with a rst part-
ner, and their e¢ cacies are shown in Tables 1 and 2. The data for contraceptive use during
rst premarital intercourse starts in the early 1960s. Between 1960 and 2002 the number
of people not using any birth control fell by a remarkable 40 percentage points. The in-
creased use of contraception may derive from two factors. First, technological improvement
has made them both e¤ective and easy to use. As more and more teenagers engage in sex
on this account, one would see an increase in their use. Second, the di¤usion of contra-
ceptives may be slow, as with any new product. The birth control movement has made
information about contraceptives widely available (in a manner similar to advertising for
other products) and access to them easy. This has greatly sped up their di¤usion. How
much is an open question, for which it would be di¢ cult to provide a quantitative answer.
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The condom is the most popular method of birth control and its use has actually increased
over time, notwithstanding the introduction of the birth control pill. Today more than half
of people use condoms for premarital sexual relationships with their rst partner. Accord-
ing to Darroch and Singh (1999), the rise of condom users played a signicant role in the
decline of pregnancies among the teenagers during the 1990s. The increase in the use of
condoms was inuenced by the expansion of formal reproductive health education during
the period. On this, Ku, Sonenstein and Pleck (1992) show that sex education about AIDS,
birth control, and resisting sexual activity is associated with more consistent condom use.
Furthermore, Lindberg, Ku and Sonenstein (2000) report that formal sex education on these
topics expanded signicantly during the 1990s.
In order to measure the decline in risk associated with premarital sex during the 20th
century, an estimate must be made for both the use and e¤ectiveness of contraception in
1900. Take the use of contraception in 1900, rst. Set use in 1900 to the values observed
in 1960-1964 period Table 1. Clearly, this is a conservative assumption since use has been
increasing steadily over time. The pill was not yet introduced in 1900. So, for 1900 allocate
the small percentage of females in the pill cell into the othercategory.
Table 1: Contraception use At First Premarital Intercourse, percent
Method 1900 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80-82 83-88 85-89 90-94 95-98 99-02
none 61.4 61.4 54.2 55.6 53.5 46.9 34.6 36.1 29.7 27.2 21.2
pill - 4.2 8.6 12.1 12.8 14.2 12.1 19.7 14.1 15.3 16.0
condom 21.9 21.9 24.0 21.0 22.0 26.7 41.8 36.4 49.9 49.8 51.2
withdrawal 7.3 7.3 9.5 7.3 7.5 8.4 8.9 5.6 3.5 4.9 7.3
other 9.7 5.3 3.7 4.0 4.2 3.8 2.6 2.2 2.8 2.8 4.3
Turn now to the e¤ectiveness of contraception in 1900. A number for e¤ectiveness in 1900
is constructed as follows: First, Kopp (1934) reports a 45 percent failure rate for condoms
and a 59.2 percent failure rate for withdrawal. His numbers are based on pre-clinical use
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by married couples who sought advice from the Birth Control Clinical Research Bureau in
New York City between 1925 and 1929. Although it seems quite high, a 45 percent failure
rate for condoms is quite close to other estimates from the same period.8 Why was the
failure rate for withdrawal so high then as well? The main reason was that partial withdrawal
was considered as e¤ective as complete withdrawal, and despite better scientic evidence this
practice did not change quickly  see Brodie (1994). Second, the other methods that people
used around 1920 were not much more e¤ective, either. Kopp (1934) reports the following
failure rates: douche, 70.6 percent; jelly or suppository, 46.6; lactation, 56.6; pessary 28.1;
sponge, 50, and safe period, 59.7. Hence, it is safe to presume that the failure rate for other
methods at the time was no more than 50 percent. Finally, following Hatcher et al. (1976)
assume that using no method, and simply taking your chances, had an 85 percent failure
rate.
Since the 1960s evidence on the e¤ectiveness of di¤erent contraceptives, for both their
ideal and typical-use, is quite systematic. First, based on several studies from the early
1960s, Tietze (1970) reports a 10 to 20 percent failure rate for condoms. According to
Hatcher et al. (1976, 1980, 1984, 1988, 1998, and 2004), the failure rates for condoms were
pretty constant at 15 to 20 percent during the 1970s and early 1980s, and then declined
to about 11 percent in the mid 1980s. Somewhat mysteriously, they rose slightly in the
1990s. Hence, the condoms failure rate has fallen from 45 to 14.5 percent, a decline of
about 200 percent, both due to technological improvement and increased knowledge about
its appropriate use.
Second, as can be seen in Table 2, the pill is the most e¤ective method of contraception.
It was introduced in the 1960s. Its initial failure rates were about 5 to 10 percent. They
declined to 3.35 percent by 1989, again due to both technological improvement and better
education about its use. Again, the failure rate rose slightly during the 1990s. Third,
even the e¤ectiveness of withdrawal has increased over time; this shows the importance of
8 Tone (2001) cites two scientic studies before the Food and Drug Administration started inspecting
condoms in the late 1930s. One of these studies from 1924 reports a 50 percent failure rate, while a later
one from 1934-35 reports a 41 percent failure rate.
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education. Finally, during this period the e¤ectiveness of other methods improved as well.
New and much more e¤ective methods, such as injections and implants, were introduced in
the 1990s.
Table 2: Effectiveness of Contraception (failure rates), percent
Method 1900 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80-82 83-88 85-89 90-94 95-98 99-02
none 85.0 85.0 85.0 85.0 85.0 85.0 85.0 85.0 85.0 85.0 85.0
pill 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 3.4 3.4 5.5 5.5 5.5
condom 45.0 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 11.0 11.0 14.5 14.5 14.5
withdrawal 59.2 22.5 22.5 22.5 22.5 22.5 20.5 20.5 20.5 23.0 23.0
other 50.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
So what is the upshot of this analysis? By combining the information on the e¤ectiveness
and use of contraceptives contained in Tables 1 and 2, one can get a measure of the extent
of technological innovation in birth control. To do this, for each year take an average over
the e¤ectiveness of each method of birth control listed in Table 2. When doing this weight
each practice by its yearly frequency of use, shown in Table 1. The upshot of this calculation
is illustrated in Figure 6, which presents the riskiness of premarital sex. Even when using
conservative estimates for 1900, this riskiness has fallen by more than 125 percent, from
about 71 percent in 1900 to 28 percent in 2002. Now, the series shown in Figure 6 has an
important endogenous component in it, specically the choice of contraceptive used.
Why individuals would choose to use one method over another is not modelled in the
analysis. Doing so could be di¢ cult, and the benet questionable. The same issue also
arises for the conventionally measured aggregate total factor productivity series used by
macroeconomists, although it is not as transparent and perhaps is less problematic. This
series e¤ectively constructs total factor productivity across plants using a Divisia index. Of
course the technology used by any particular plant is an endogenous variable, and there is a
large variance in the technological practice adopted across plants. The important thing to
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Figure 6: Technological improvement in the e¤ectiveness and use of contraceptives
note is that the data used for constructing the risk of pregnancy reported in Figure 6 are
conditioned upon an individual having sex. Hence, the data used are not directly a¤ected by
the decision to have sex or not, which is the margin under study. That is, the series plotted
shows the average failure rate over time conditioned upon a person deciding to engage in
premarital sex.9
9 Take the expected cost of sex, when adopting a particular contraceptive j, to be given by the sum
of the failure rate,  j , and the cost of using the contraceptive, cj . This will keep the linear structure
adopted in the text. Let  j = 	j(; z; e) be method js failure rate for a type- teenager and, analo-
gously, cj = Cj(; z; e) represent the cost of using contraceptive j. Here  might represent factors such
as carefulness, impatience, parental inuence, etc. Both the failure rates and costs for contraceptives are
taken to be functions of the levels of technology, z, and sex education, e. For instance, the e¢ cacies
of the withdrawal and rhythm methods were improved solely via education. The cost of obtaining con-
traceptives was reduced by the birth control movement. The contraceptive chosen by a type- teenager
will be j = J(; z; e) = argmin
j=1; ;m
f	j(; z; e) + Cj(; z; e)g. The average failure rate will be given by
 = 	(z; e) =
R
	J(;z;e)()dF (), where F is the distribution over type. Note that  has been assumed
to be independent of a teenagers preference for sex, s. The average cost of a contraceptive will be given by
c = C(z; e) =
R
CJ(;z;e)(; z; e)dF (). Think about the latter as being netted out from the joy of sex, s.
The analysis here factors out the idiosyncratic factors associated with the e¢ cacy and cost of contraceptives,
and focuses on the failure rate for a representative teenager, so to speak.
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9 Calibration
Prior to simulating the model, values must be assigned to the various parameters governing
tastes, the matching technology, and the type distribution. Toward this end set up the type
distribution, S(s), so that it approximates a truncated normal, where the truncation points
are 2.5 standard deviations on either side of the mean. An evenly spaced grid of 300 points
is used for S. Hence, S(s) will be governed by two parameters, namely its mean, s, and
standard deviation, &s. Given this, there are 8 parameters to pick: , , , , u, v, s, and
&s. This is done in the following manner:10
1. Matching parameters, ,  and . In 2002 roughly 34.4 percent of teenagers between the
ages of 15 and 19 had coitus within the last 3 months.11 Adolescent relationships are
pretty short. On average a teens rst sexual relationship lasts for almost 6 months.
The median duration of an adolescent relationship is about 13 months.12 Now,
construct a simple Markov chain to match these two facts. Let teenagers match with
probably  and breakup with probability . Given the short duration of teenage
relationships, take the model period to be a quarter. This implies that there will be
20 periods of teenage life between the ages of 15 and 19, inclusive. The mean duration
of a relationship is given by 1=. Thus, let 1= = 13=3 so that  = 0:231. This high
destruction rate speaks for relatively fast transitional dynamics, in light of Lemma
3. Next, choose a value for  so that the statistical mechanics of the (; )-matching
technology imply that on average a teenager will be sexually active 34.4 percent of
time between ages 15 and 19. Assume that a teenager starts o¤ unmatched at the end
10 The model is an innite horizon framework. The real world is made up of nitely-lived overlapping
generations. Every year a new generation of young people enters into the dating world for the rst time,
while members of older cohorts exit due to marriage. This mismatch between the data and the model
appears to be second order, as the results in Section 10 will show.
11 This number is taken from Abma et al. (2004, Table 4, p. 19).
12 Sources: Ryan, Manlove, and Franzetta (2003) and Udry and Bearman (1998). According to Udry
and Bearman (1998), the median duration is about 10 months when the respondent is a male and about 13
months when the respondent is a female. The latter is taken here, although the results are very similar if
instead a duration of 10 months is targeted.
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of his/her 14th year. Let j represent the odds of a teenager being matched j periods
down the road. Thus, 1  j is the probability of being unmatched then. These odds
are given by 24 j
1  j
35 =
24 1   
 1  
35j 24 0
1
35 ; for j = 1;    ; 20. (21)
The fraction of a promiscuous teenagers life spent in a sexually active relationship is
then
P20
j=1 j=20. Therefore, pick  so that 0:75 
P20
j=1 j=20 = 0:344, where it will
be assumed that 75 percent of the 2002 population is sexually active see below. This
results in  = 0:222. Last, a twenty-period teenage life dictates setting  = 1  1=20.
2. Type distribution parameters, s and &s. Now, in 1900 only 6 percent of unmarried
teenage girls engaged in premarital sex. This had risen to 75 percent by 2002. The
model is solved for two steady states. The rst one mimics the year 1900. For this one,
set  =  1900 = 0:2676, which is the quarterly failure rate for 1900. The second steady
state matches the year 2002. Here, pick  =  2002 = 0:0802.
13 Last, the mean and
standard deviation, s and &s, are specied so that in the rst steady state 6 percent
of people engage in premarital sex, while in the second 75 percent do. Note that for
the model, the probability of a person nding a mate in their teenage years is given
by   1   (1   )(1   )=[1   (1   )]. Hence, equations (17) and (18) should be
solved while setting #P1900 = 0:06 and #P2002 = 0:75. The result is s = 0:1432
and &s = 0:0833. Note that Lemma 1 implies that in a steady state the number of
people in A and P depends solely on the cost of sex,  , and the shape of the S(s)
distribution, as governed here by s and &s. Therefore, for given values of  ,  and ,
the above procedure solves the two steady-state equations determining the number of
people engaged in premarital sex for the two unknowns s and &s. Given the setup of
the model, there does not seem to be another so-natural criteria for choosing s and &s.
13 According to the calculations in Section 8.2, the risk of pregnancy was 0.7122 per year in 1900 and
0.2843 per year in 2002. If the probability of pregnancy over a year is b , then take the quarterly probability,
 , to be given by  = 1  (1  b )(1=4).
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Especially because statistics describing the properties of matching within a class, such
as the average number of partners for a sexually active person, do not depend upon
the shape of the S(s) distribution, as was mentioned in Section 6.
3. Taste parameters, , u, and v. Given that a period is one quarter, set  = 0:99. In the
simulation the values chosen for u and v dont matter very much. In fact, theoretically
they dont a¤ect the steady state at all. In light of this, simply set u  v = 1 and let
v = jminfs1; 0gj +  1900. The latter restriction ensures that lifetime utility is always
positive.
The model is now ready to be simulated.
10 Social Change: The Computational Experiment
Go back in time to 1900. Premarital sex is dangerous, since a young woman runs a 71
percent risk of pregnancy. Given this, the vast majority of youth chose to live abstinent
lifestyles. Sex is a taboo subject. All of this is about to change due to technological progress
in contraception. Over time the risk of pregnancy declines. This changes the cost and benet
calculation of engaging in premarital sex. Slowly more and more people engage in it so that
by 2002 a substantial majority of teens are experiencing it. Can the model capture this
pattern of social change?
To answer this question, start the model economy o¤ in a steady state resembling the
situation in 1900. Then, subject it to the time path of technological progress for contra-
ception that is observed in the data from 1900 to 2002, as calculated in Section 8.2. When
doing this assume for simplicity that there is no technological advance in contraception after
2002. Given this the economy will eventually converge to a situation resembling 2002, given
Point 2 in Section 9. Now, calculate the resulting time path for the type distributions in the
abstinent and promiscuous classes for the model economy. Does the resulting time path for
teenagers engaging in premarital sex resemble the pattern observed in the U.S. data? That
is the question.
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10.1 2002 Steady State
To glean some insight into the models mechanics, focus for a moment on the matching set
that obtains in the nal steady state. This is portrayed in Figure 7. The horizontal axes
simply plot s and es pairs, or the types for the potential match (where 1 is the lowest index
for type, and 300 the highest). The vertical axis reports a value of zero when a match doesnt
occur, and a non-zero value when one will. The varying heights denote di¤erent matching
situations. For instance, the trough in the center reects the situation where both types
rst choice is an abstinent match. The adjacent block on the left reports a mixing situation
[X(s; es) = Y (s; es) = 1=2]. Here s would prefer an abstinent match and es a promiscuous one.
Half of the matches in this zone will be abstinent, and the other half promiscuous. The other
adjacent block on the right reects the same situation with the positions of s and es reversed.
These matches were discussed in Points 3 and 4 of Section 7.1. Hence, they wont occur in
steady state since, since all s <  will be in A and all s >  will be in P. Since only mixing
situations occur when couples have di¤ering views on the desirability of sex, the corollary to
Lemma 3 suggests that the models transitional dynamics will be rapid. Now, move to the
large area in the corner at the back of the gure. This block gives the (s; es) combinations
where a promiscuous match is the rst choice of both individuals. Note that according to
Figure 7, no agent rejects a match; i.e., the blocks exhaust the type space. This result is
sensitive to the values of  ,  and . Promiscuity is more costly the higher is  . A match
becomes more valuable, relative to searching, as  and  fall. When  is low it is hard to
nd a mate, and when  is small the benets from a relationship are enduring. Therefore,
when both  and  are low an agent is reluctant to decline a potential partner.
10.2 Transitional Dynamics
Now, turn to the transitional dynamics. The model has little trouble replicating the rise
in premarital sex over the last century, as can be seen from Figure 8. Note that the model
gives a S-shaped di¤usion pattern for the increase in premarital sex, a pattern also visible in
data. This is characteristic of technological adoption, here contraceptives. Observe that the
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Figure 7: Matching set, nal steady state
sharpest rate of increase in premarital sex, for both the model and the data, occurs when the
drop in the risk of pregnancy is most precipitous (i.e., after 1960). Premarital sex rises faster
in the data than in the model, however.14 This could be due to missing factors, such as the
legalization of abortion. Note that in the U.S. there is a downturn in the rate of premarital
sex after 1987, perhaps due to the fear of AIDS. The benchmark model cant mimic this.
The impact that abortion and HIV/AIDS had on premarital sex will be analyzed in Section
14 Note that the model reacts very quickly in response to the inputted technology series. This was
suggested by the corollary to Lemma 3, as was discussed in Section 10.1. It is also due to the very smooth
nature of inputted technology series which exhibits little change on a period by period basis. As a result of
this, simply using the models steady-state condition would also do a reasonable job in predicting the rise in
premarital sex. The same is true of the neoclassical growth model. The steady-state condition setting the
marginal production of capital to a constant interest rate plus depreciation predicts almost perfectly the time
path for postwar GDP (per hour), after inputting in a series for total factor productivity for the details,
see http://www.econ.rochester.edu/Faculty/GreenwoodPapers/ncgm.pdf. This works because total factor
productivity moves in a smooth, predictable manner over time. Hence, the need for the models dynamics
are minimized. (Furthermore, the standard implementation of the neoclassical growth also exhibits rapid
dynamics.) Notwithstanding this, very few would suggest throwing out the workhorse of macroeconomics
for a simple condition setting the marginal product of capital equal to a constant rental rate.
34
1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
Year
0
20
40
60
80
P
re
m
ar
ita
l s
ex
ua
l a
ct
iv
ity
, %
5
10
15
20
25
R
is
k 
of
 p
re
gn
an
cy
, %
 (q
ua
rte
rly
)
Risk
U.S. Data
Model
Figure 8: Rise in premarital sex, U.S. data and model
10.4. Still, its surprising how far the analysis can go without such considerations.
The model generates a prediction on how many teenage girls will get pregnant each
period. Figure 9 shows the percentage of girls who will get pregnant, both in the data and
the model. The total number of pregnancies in the data is calculated as the sum of births,
abortions and miscarriages for unmarried females between ages 15 and 19. The model
predicts a rise and decline in the number of pregnancies, the same pattern as is observed in
the data. Quantitatively speaking, the model overpredicts the number of pregnancies. Now,
note that the number of pregnancies should be the product of the percentage of females
practicing premarital sex multiplied by the failure rate. For the year 2002 about 34 percent
of females were having premarital sex. The quarterly failure was 8 percent. So, about
10:9 = 4  0:08  34 percent of girls should have become pregnant. Yet, only 7 percent
actually did. Thus, there seems to be a mismatch in the underlying data concepts. Perhaps
the reported failure rate are too high, or the number of pregnancies recorded too low. In
particular, contraceptive use at rst premarital intercourse exaggerates the risk of pregnancy
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Figure 9: Increase in teenage pregnancies, U.S. data and model
for an average teenager. Sexually experienced teenagers are more likely to use contraceptives,
as well as to adopt more e¤ective methods of birth control. Indeed, if the risk of pregnancy is
recalculated for the year 2002 using conceptive use at last intercourse (somewhat less reliable
data) the failure rate drops from 8 to 6 percent. The model then predicts that 8.2 percent
(= 4 0:06 34) of teenage girls should have become pregnant (as opposed to 10.9 percent)
which is much more in line with the data.
10.2.1 The Standard Search Model
Its interesting to compare the framework developed with a more standard search model.
Visualize the world where all unattached people must search for a mate in a single class.15
Search now is less e¢ cient. Individuals who are inclined toward abstinence may now meet
15 As before, let A(s; es) and P (s; es) denote the value of abstinent and promiscuous relationships, and
X(s; es) 2 f0; 1=2; 1g and Y (s; es) 2 f0; 1=2; 1g denote the probabilities that such relationships will occur,
conditional upon a meeting between s and es. Again, Z(s; es) = 1 X(s; es)  Y (s; es). Additionally, let Q(s)
denote the value of s searching in the lone pool of unattached people, with $j representing the odds of
meeting a type-j person. The value function when s is in an abstinent relationship with es, or A(s; es), will
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those who are predisposed toward promiscuity, or vice versa. At the benchmark parameter
values this leads to too much promiscuity. Take an individual whose tastes favor abstinence.
At some time in her teenage life she may draw a partner with a propensity toward promiscu-
ity. Rather than lose this person she may consent to a sexual relationship. This female would
now become permanently classied as experienced in U.S. vital statistics some things in
life cant be reversed. At the benchmark parameter values about 25 percent of people are
sexually experienced in the initial steady state, as opposed to 6 percent in 1900. One might
think that the type distribution can be recalibrated to overcome this along the lines of Point
2 in Section 9. Surprisingly, there does not seem to exist values for the two type distribution
parameters, s and &s, that allow both the 1900 and 2002 targets to be hit.
10.2.2 The Power of the Pill
The rise in premarital sex is often associated with the invention of the birth control pill.
The model can be used to assess this claim. In particular, one can run the counterfactual
experiment where no pill is invented. The rst step in the experiment is to calculate the
risk of premarital sex without the pill. This is easy to do using the information provided
in Tables 1 and 2. Specically, allocate birth control pill users across the other method of
contraceptions, including withdrawal, according to their frequency of use. After having done
this, construct a new series for the risk of pregnancy in the same manner as before. Rerun
the simulations using this new series. The upshot of the experiment is shown in Figure 10.
As can be seen, the invention of the birth control pill contributed very little to the rise in
premarital sex among teenagers. For example, in 2002 it accounted for 1 percentage points
read
A(s; es) = u+ (1  )[X 0(s; es)A0(s; es) + Y 0(s; es)P 0(s; es)]
+[ + (1  )Z 0(s; es)Q0(s)]:
Likewise, the value of search, when s is unattached, is given by
Q(s) = v + [X 0(s; es)A0(s; es) + Y 0(s; es)P 0(s; es)]
+[(1  ) + Pj $jZ 0(s; esj)]Q0(s):
The rest of the setting can be constructed by making similar changes.
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Figure 10: The power of the pill
out of the 75 percent of girls who had experienced sex by age 19. The reason is simple.
The pill is not used by a large number of teenage girls, and once this number is allocated to
other methods the overall e¤ects are small. Thus, its introduction did not a¤ect the risk of
pregnancy much. A similar experiment can be conducted for condoms, with much the same
result. Thus, no one particular contraceptive is responsible for the sexual revolution, since
there were readily available reasonable alternatives.
10.3 Cross-Sectional Implications on the Number of Partners
Relationships are governed in the models steady state by a Markov chain structure. Recall
that the probability of a meeting, , and the odds of a breakup, , are chosen so that the
Markov chain (21) generates the fraction of teenage age life spent in a relationship and the
observed median duration for one that are observed in the U.S. data. The Markov chain
matching technology also yields predictions on the number of partners that a promiscuous
person will have between the ages of 15 and 19, or across 20 model periods.
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In order to calculate the total number of partners per promiscuous agent over 20 model
periods, let mjt denote the number of matched agents with j sexual encounters by time t and
ujt represent the number of unmatched agents with j sexual encounters. Then, the number
of matched individuals with j sexual encounters in period t+ 1 is given by
mjt+1 = (1  )mjt + uj 1t . (22)
In this equation, the fraction (1  ) of matched promiscuous people with j lifetime partners
in period t will remain in their current relationship next period so that these individuals will
still have j partners then, while the proportion  of single agents with j   1 partners will
nd matches and thus have j partners next period. In similar fashion,
ujt+1 = (1  )ujt + mjt : (23)
An upper bound on the maximum number of partners after T periods of matching is N =
T=2 + 1. Thus, equations (22) and (23) dene a Markov chain over fm0t ; u0t ;    ;mNt ; uNt g.
This Markov chain can be simulated for T periods starting from the initial distribution
f0; 1;    ; 0; 0g. It can be used to calculate the mean number of total partners per individual
over T periods see the Appendix, Section 13.3, for more detail.16
In 2002 a sexually active teenage girl had 3.0 partners by age 19. The Markov chains
prediction is 2.5. While the means are close, the data exhibits far more cross-sectional
variation than the Markov chain does as Table 3 shows. As can be seen, in the data far more
girls have just one partner than predicted by the Markov chain for matching. At the same
time, a much larger number of girls have more than 7 partners in the data than is forecasted
by the Markov chain. How to model such heterogeneity is an interesting issue? Cutting the
length of the period might help, because this limits the number of partners that one may
16 Note that Markov chain used in the model is slightly di¤erent from the one t to the U.S. data. In
the real world teenage life lasts a xed number of years, here taken to be the 5 years between 15 and 19,
inclusive. In the model they exit teenage life each period with probability 1  . Recall that  is set so that
teenage life expectancy is 5 years. This does not lead to signicant di¤erence in the two Markov chains
predictions on the number of partners.
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have. Allowing for on-the-relationship search could aid in this regard too.17 Modelling
unfaithfulness (that is simultaneous relationships by a person) might be important here.
Additionally, one could have a higher destruction rate, , for matches for some individuals
as opposed to others. This could proxy for the fact that some people tire more easily of
their partners, than do others. These are the type of extensions that the next generation of
models may be able to entertain.
TABLE 3: Number of Partners
(Active females by age 19, fraction)
# of Partners 1 2 to 3 4 to 6 7+
Data 0.390 0.306 0.171 0.133
Markov chain 0.1343 0.7205 0.1451 0.0001
10.4 Abortion and HIV
In 1973 the Supreme Court struck down a Texas law that criminalized abortion except
when the life of the mother was in jeopardy. The ruling e¤ectively provided free access to
abortion in the United States. The number of abortions immediately rose, as Figure 11
illustrates. About 56 percent of pregnancies were terminated in 1979. One of the e¤ects of
the legalization of abortion was undoubtedly to reduce the cost of premarital sex. In 1982 the
word AIDS was used for the rst time. Since that time AIDS and HIV have spread through
the population. Due to an aggressive public health campaign, the fraction of the population
with AIDS and HIV appears to have now stabilized. The presence of HIV, however, has
undoubtedly made sexual activity more risky.
The e¤ects of the liberalization of abortion laws and the discovery of HIV will now be
incorporated into the analysis. To this end, let a represent the cost of an abortion, b
denote the cost of an out-of-wedlock birth, and h be the cost of contracting HIV. Let 
be the odds of becoming pregnant for a girl engaging in premarital sex. Some fraction 
17 The standard search model has di¢ culty generating enough dispersion in wages. Krusell, Hornstein
and Violante (2006) suggest that on-the-job search may help to resolve this problem.
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Figure 11: The prevalence of abortion and HIV
of these girls will terminate their pregnancies, while the fraction 1    will bear the child.
Likewise, specify  to be the probability of contracting HIV in a sexual relationship. Given
this notation, the expected cost of premarital sex,  , can therefore be written as
 = a + b(1  ) + h:
Without loss of generality, normalize b = 1.
The parameters a and h will be picked to so that the model does the best possible job in
explaining the trend toward premarital sex. The numbers , , and  are all taken from the
data. The probability of becoming pregnant, , is given by the failure rates calculated above.
The time series for the fraction of pregnancies terminated in an abortion, , is presented
in Figure 11. Last, the probability of contacting HIV depends on: (i) the probability of
having sex with an infected person; (ii) whether or not a condom is used in sex; (iii) the
transmission rate for unprotected sex, or when a condom fails. The odds of meeting an HIV
infected person are given in Figure 11. Condoms are taken to have a 13 percent failure rate
Davis and Weller (1999). Again, Table 1 gives the usage of condoms. All other methods of
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contraception are assumed to have a 100 percent failure rate against becoming infected with
HIV. Table 4 gives the e¤ectiveness of contraception, after weighting each method by its use,
against HIV. Estimates of the transmission rate are quite varied. Davis and Weller (1999)
report a 6.8/100 transmission rate for males to females and one of 5.9/100 from females to
males. A value of 1/1000 is given in Pinkerton and Ambramson (1997). An intermediate
rate of 1/100 is used here. Note that since this rate is a constant any error here will simply
be absorbed in the estimate for h.
Table 4: Effectiveness of contraception against HIV
80-82 83-88 85-89 90-94 95-98 99-02
Failure Rate, percent 76.77 63.63 68.33 56.55 56.66 55.46
The empirical procedure picks a = 0:4602 and h = 1; 704:6. Therefore, an abortion is
less costly than an out-of-wedlock birth, while contracting HIV is much more costly. Figure
12 shows the t. As can be seen, the model does much better once abortion and HIV
are allowed for. Observe that the risk associated with premarital sex declines rapidly after
1972 due to the legalization of abortion. As a consequence, the number of young females
experiencing premarital sex increases more rapidly than in the benchmark model. The risk
of premarital sex rises after 1982 due to HIV. This operates to dampen the trend toward
premarital sex vis à vis the benchmark model.
11 The Frequency of Sex: A Proposed Extension
11.1 Facts
As contraceptive technology became more e¤ective, and its use more widespread, one might
expect that the frequency of premarital sex within a promiscuous relationship should rise
also. This is the case. The earliest source on the frequency of sex is Kinsey et al. (1953).
They report a mean frequency of sex for active females between the ages of 16 and 19
of 0.5 times per week, or 7.92 times per quarter Kinsey et al. (1953, Table 76, p. 334).
This classic study is based on female histories collected over the 1938 to 1950 period. Since
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Figure 12: The models t with abortion and HIV
the sample consists of women/girls between ages 2 and 71+, the data on premarital sexual
experience provides information for the earlier periods as well. So, presuppose that the
frequency of sex for teenagers with premarital sexual experience was 7.92 times per quarter
in 1900.18
Now, move forward to recent times. Abma et al. (2004, Table 6, p. 21) report frequency
for females aged 15-19 for the year 2002. Table 5 shows some statistics based on their ndings.
As can be seen, the mean monthly frequency for girls with premarital sexual experience was
3.18 times, which translates into a quarterly frequency of 12.71.19 Therefore, the frequency
of sex between practicing partners rose by a factor of 1.6 over the last century. It is also
interesting to note the wide dispersion in the frequency of sex, about which little will be said
here.
18 Unfortunately, the study does not report the frequency of premarital intercourse by birth cohorts.
19 Zelnick, Kanter and Ford (1981, Table 3.7, p. 86) report a mean frequencies of 2.9 and 2.6 for 1971 and
1976. These lie between the Kinsey et al. (1953) and Abma et al. (2004) numbers, as would be expected.
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TABLE 5: Monthly Frequency of Sex
(Active females, ages 15 to 19)
# of times distribution
0 0.3890
1 0.0945
2 to 3 (= 2.5) 0.1604
4 to 7 (= 5.5) 0.1495
8+ (= 9) 0.2066
Mean = 3.177
11.2 A Framework for Studying Frequency
To model the above facts, change the term in the utility function involving sex to
lnfes exp(f =  =)g = ln es+ f =  =; with  < 0 and  > 0; (24)
where f represents the frequency of sex and es now denotes the joy from it. Let the cost of
sex be given by e = 1  pf , (25)
where p is the odds of having a safe sexual encounter. Observe that 1  pf is the probability
of becoming pregnant, or the failure rate, given the frequency of sex f . The cost function is
increasing and concave in f , since
de 
df
=   (ln p) pf > 0 and d
2e 
(df)2
=   (ln p)2 pf < 0;
where the signs of the above expressions follow from the fact that 0  p  1. Therefore,
while the chances of getting pregnant increase with the frequency of sex, they do so at a
diminishing rate.
Cast an individuals decision regarding the frequency of sex as follows:
max
f
fln es+ f =  =  1 + pfg:
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The rst- and second- order conditions for this problem are
f  1 =  (ln p)pf ; (26)
and
(  1)f  2 + (ln p)2pf < 0: (27)
The rst-order condition simply sets the marginal benet from coitus, f  1, equal to its
marginal cost,  (ln p)pf . One might expect the frequency of sex will rise with an improve-
ment in the e¤ectiveness of contraceptives, or a fall in p. Strictly speaking this need not be
the case since the marginal cost of sex is not necessarily decreasing in p.
Lemma 4 The frequency of sex, f , increases or decreases with the e¤ectiveness of contra-
ception, p, depending on whether   ln p S 1=f .
Proof. Di¤erentiating the e¢ ciency condition (26) yields
df
dp
=
 pf 1   (ln p)fpf 1
(  1)f  2 + (ln p)2pf :
The second-order condition (27) implies that the denominator of the above expression is
negative. Next see that  pf 1   (ln p)fpf 1 S 0 as   ln p S 1=f .
Now, for empirically relevant values of p and f it will transpire that df=dp > 0, as will be
clear from the discussion below.
Given the form of (24) the marginal benet from sex does not depend on the persons typees. This abstraction is unrealistic, yet its simplicity is a big virtue. It allows the framework
for the frequency of sex to be tacked on to the existing apparatus in a very simple manner,
as will be discussed. If type and frequency are allowed to interact then each partner to a
match would have to bargain over frequency, at least if their types di¤ered.
Is the above framework consistent with the observed increase in the frequency of sex?
The answer is yes. The question really amounts to asking whether or not there exits values
for  and  such that the e¢ ciency condition (26) returns the observed frequencies of sex in
1900 and 2002, given the observed probabilities of safe sex in these years. To this end, note
from (25) that the probability of a safe sexual encounter is given by pt = (1  e t)1=ft, where
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the subscript t refers to the time period for a variable. Recall that the quarterly failure
rate of contraception in 1900 was 0.27 and the observed frequency of sex 7.92. Hence, the
probability of a safe sexual encounter in 1900 is given by p1900 = (1  0:2676)1=7:92 = 0:9614.
Likewise, in 2002 the odds of not becoming pregnant were p2002 = (1 0:0802)1=12:71 = 0:9934.
Interestingly, while a single sexual encounter in 2002 looks very safe, having sex 412:71 = 51
times over the course of the year results in a 28.5 percent chance of pregnancy.
Next, it follows from (26) that
(
f2002
f1900
) 1 =
(ln p2002)(p2002)
f2002
(ln p1900)(p1900)f1900
:
This equation can be used to pin down a value for , given observations for f1900, f2002, p1900,
and p2002. Specically,
 = ln

(ln p2002)(p2002)
f2002
(ln p1900)(p1900)f1900

= ln

f2002
f1900

+ 1 =  2:30.
Finally, a value for  can also be backed out from (26). In particular, set
 =
(  ln p1900)(p1900)
(f1900) 1
= 26:5:
To summarize given  =  2:30 and  = 26:5, the above procedure implies that the rst-order
condition (26) will return f = 7:92 when p = 0:9614, and f = 12:71 when p = 0:9934. The
second-order condition (27) also holds when evaluated at the 1900 and 2002 values. Thus,
a maximum obtains notwithstanding the concave cost function.20 With regard to Lemma
2, observe that once the framework has been calibrated to match the observed (fairly small)
values for f it must transpire that df=dp > 0, since ln p ' 0.
Last, to tack the above framework onto the earlier model simply let ln es = s 2 S =
fs1; s2;    ; sng and  =  f = + = + e . Hence, the cost of sex in Section 2 must now
incorporate into it the utility derived from the optimal frequency of sex. Transforming the
type distribution in this way and following the procedure mentioned in Section 9, Point 2,
results in s =  11:3337 and &s = 0:1125.
20 Also, note that f =   =   (1   p)f > 0 for both 1900 and 2002 so that an individual is obtaining
positive utility from the frequency of sex. This consideration is important for deciding which matches to
accept or reject, or which social class to join.
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12 Conclusions
What causes social change? The idea here is that a large part of social change is a reaction to
technological progress in the economy. Technological progress a¤ects societys consumption
and production possibilities. It therefore changes individualsincentives to abide by social
customs and mores. As people gradually change their behavior to take advantage of emerging
opportunities, custom slowly evolves too.
This notion is applied here to the rocket-like rise in premarital sex that occurred over
the last century. Now, a majority of youth engage in premarital sex. One hundred years
ago almost none did. This is traced here to the dramatic decline in risk of pregnancy,
due technological improvement in contraceptives. This is modeled within the context of an
equilibrium matching model. The model has two key ingredients. First, individuals weigh
the cost and benet of coitus when engaging in premarital sexual activity. Second, they
associate with individuals who share their own proclivities. Such a model mimics well the
observed rise in premarital sexual activity, given the observed decline in the risk of sex.
The analysis does not say that there is no role for culture. For instance, between 1900
and 2000 there was a 12 percentage point increase in the number of teenagers engaging in
premarital sex without the use of contraceptives, with an associated rise in out-of-wedlock
births. Perhaps this speaks to change in culture. Or, it may be telling of changing economic
circumstance. In seventeenth century England it was not economically feasible for a young
women to raise a child out of wedlock. Pregnancies were secretly aborted. Babies were
abandoned or killed. The Church frowned on such practices. Bastardy was also a great
nancial burden for a Parish. For both of these reasons, the Church treated out-of-wedlock
births harshly. According to Stone (1977, p. 634), Bastardy cases tended to be treated
severely, although sentences varied from place to place and justice to justice. In 1601 the
Lancashire Quarter sessions condemned the father and mother of an illegitimate child to
be publicly whipped and then sat in the stocks still naked from the waist upwards, with
a placard on there heads reading These persons are punished for fornication.Given the
draconian measures used to control out-of-wedlock births, it is not surprising that sex was
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a taboo subject. Wilkinson (1973) argues that in primitive societies many social norms
regulating sexual practice and child bearing were really mechanisms designed to ensure that
population size remained within an economys food supply. In modern times it is easy to
regulate fertility using contraceptives, and economically feasible for a woman to have an
out-of-wedlock birth. Thus, the necessity for such harsh punishment is no longer needed.21
The (likely) increase in homosexuality is almost certainly driven by a change in attitudes.
Even here, however, ndings reported in Rosenfeld and Kim (2005) suggest that higher living
standards, which have allowed young adults to leave the home earlier and thereby develop
more independent lifestyles, have facilitated the rise in homosexuality. This is in the spirit of
Ogburn and Nimko¤ (1955), who argued that changes in contraceptive technology, together
with urbanization that allows more anonymity, led to changes in sexual mores.
Improvement in contraceptive technology may also partially explain the decline in the
fraction of life spent married for a female from 0.88 in 1950 to 0.60 in 1995.22 This is due to
delays in rst marriages and remarriages, and a rise in divorce. Historically, the institution
of marriage was a mechanism to have safe sex, among other things. As sex became safer,
the need for marriage declined on this account. According to Becker (1991, p. 326):
Since the best way to learn about someone else is by being together, intensive
search is more e¤ective when unwed couples spend considerable time together,
perhaps including trial marriages. Yet when contraceptives are crude and un-
reliable, trial marriages and other premarital contact greatly raise the risk of
pregnancy. The signicant increase during this century in the frequency of trial
marriages and other premarital contact has been in part a rational response to
major improvements in contraceptive techniques, and is not decisive evidence
that young people now value sexual experiences more than they did in the past.
An interesting avenue for future research might be to investigate the implications of the
contraceptive revolution for marriage and divorce.23
21 On this, Lee (1975) argues that rising wages played a key role in the rise in premarital pregnancies in
Bavaria between 1750 and 1850. The wage index for agricultural servants (where most of the premarital
pregnancies occurred) rose 6 or 7 times over the period 1654 to 1869 (see his Table 7).
22 This fact is taken from Greenwood and Guner (2004), and is analyzed from a di¤erent perspective there.
23 Interestingly, Choo and Siow (2006) estimate, using an non-transferable utility model of the U.S.
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13 Appendix
13.1 Lemma 1
Proof. To begin with, establish that there is no incentive for a matched couple inA to switch
to P, or vice versa. To this end, subtract (1) from (3) to obtain P (s; es)   A(s; es) = s    .
Clearly, P (s; es)   A(s; es) R 0 as s R  . Thus, there is no gain for a matched couple (s; es)
2 P or another one (s; es) 2 A to switch from their respective social classes.
What about unmatched people? Conjecture a solution for the decision rules in steady
state. Specically, assume that:
(i) H(s; es) = I(s; es) = L(s) = 1 and J(s; es) = 0 for all s; es 2 A,
(ii) H(s; es) = L(s) = 0 and J(s; es) = K(s; es) = 1 for all s; es 2 P.
Now, (i) and (ii) imply that X(s; es) = 1 and Y (s; es) = 0 for (s; es) 2 A, and X(s; es) = 0 and
Y (s; es) = 1 for (s; es) 2 P. Additionally, (i) and (ii) imply that Q(s) < B(s) for s 2 A and
Q(s) > B(s) for s 2 P. This conjectured solution will now be veried. For a given set of
decisions rules, the recursions (1) to (4) dene a contraction mapping. So, imagine a xed
point for the value functions predicated upon the conjectured set of decisions rules. If the
resulting value functions imply the hypothesized decision rules then an equilibrium with the
specied properties has been found. First, note that in the conjectured steady state j = 0
for all j > c and $j = 0 for all j < c. Using this observation, subtract (2) from (4) in steady
state to get
Q(s) B(s) = 
nX
j=c+1
$j[X(s; esj)A(s; esj) + Y (s; esj)P (s; esj)]
 
cX
j=0
j[X(s; esj)A(s; esj) + Y (s; esj)P (s; esj)]
+[(1  ) + 
nX
j=c+1
$jZ(s; esj)]fL(s)B(s) + [1  L(s)]Q(s)g
 [(1  ) + 
cX
j=0
jZ(s; esj)]fL(s)B(s) + [1  L(s)]Q(s)g:
marriage market, that the gains for marriage accruing to young adults fell sharply between 1971 and 1981.
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For s 2 P (which implies s >  ) it is easy to see that
Q(s) B(s) = P (s; esj)   cX
j=0
j[X(s; esj)A(s; esj) + Y (s; esj)P (s; esj)]
+(1  )Q(s)  [(1  ) + 
cX
j=0
jZ(s; esj)]B(s)
> (1  )[Q(s) B(s)]:
[Note that P (s; esj) > A(s; esj) for s and that 0  X(s; esj) + Y (s; esj)  1.] Now, clearly
this equation cannot be satised for Q(s)   B(s) < 0. Hence, Q(s)   B(s) > 0. Thus, no
unmatched s 2 P would want to switch. A similar argument can be made for s 2 A. The
hypothesized solution for L(s) has now been veried. [That is, assuming that (i) and (ii)
hold on the righthand side implies that on the lefthand side Q(s)   B(s) R 0 as s R  .
Thus, the lefthand side supports the conjectured solution for L(s).]
Next, given (i) and (ii), when (s; es) 2 A equations (1) and (2) can be represented by
A(s; es) = u+ (1  )A(s; es) + B(s);
and
B(s) = v + A(s; es) + (1  )B(s):
Clearly, when (s; es) 2 A then A(s; es) is no longer a function of es. Direct calculation reveals
that
A(s) =
[1  (1  )]u+ v

; (28)
and
B(s) =
[1  (1  )]v + u

; (29)
where   (1  ) [1  (1    )] > 0. For future reference, let an asterisk attached to a
function denote its closed-form solution that obtains in steady state, dened only over the
equilibrium set of agents that live in the relevant social class. Observe that A(s) > B(s),
as was conjectured, because u > v. Therefore, H(s; es) = I(s; es) = 1 and J(s; es) = 0 for (s; es)
2 A.
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Likewise, for (s; es) 2 P note that equations (3) and (4) can then be rewritten as
P (s; es) = u+ s   + (1  )P (s; es) + Q(s);
and
Q(s) = v + P (s; es) + (1  )Q(s):
The solutions to these two equations are given by
P (s) =
(u+ s   )[1  (1  )] + v

; (30)
and
Q(s) =
[1  (1  )]v + (u+ s   )

: (31)
It is easy to see that
P (s) Q(s) = (u+ s     v)(1  )

:
Thus, P (s) > Q(s) when u + s    > v, which will hold for all s >  . Consequently,
for (s; es) 2 P it transpires that H(s; es) = 0 and J(s; es) = K(s; es) = 1. It has now been
shown that (i) H(s; es) = I(s; es) = L(s) = 1 and J(s; es) = 0 for all (s; es) 2 A, and (ii) that
H(s; es) = L(s) = 0 and J(s; es) = K(s; es) = 1 for all s; es 2 P.
13.2 Lemma 3
Proof. The proof proceeds using the guess-and-verify strategy. To this end, suppose that the
value functions A(s; es), B(s), P (s; es), and Q(s) immediately jump to their new steady-state
values upon the once-and-all decline in  . Now, consider a pair in the situation described
by Point 1 in Section 7.1. The payo¤s for matched individuals with s; es 2 fsd+1;    ; sng
will be given by (30) and (31). Note that when this match breaks up person s will not have
to worry about subsequently matching in P with a es 2 fs1;    ; sdg, given Point 2. Thus,
from their own limited perspective, these agents will be immediately jumping into the new
steady state since they will never have to mix with a type in the set fs1;    ; sdg. Next,
focus upon those individuals in the situation outlined by Point 2. Their payo¤s will again
be described by (30) and (31). Again, if they switch to P they will not have to worry about
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matching next period with a es 2 fs1;    ; sdg. So, from their viewpoint, these agents will be
immediately moving into the new steady-state situation in P. (The optimality of the steady
state from an individuals perspective is detailed in the proof of Lemma 1.)
Now, move to Point 3. Let s 2 fs1;    ; sdg and es 2 fsd+1;    ; scg. For it to be
optimal for s to be matched with es in this situation in A it must transpire that A(s; es) >
maxfB(s); Q(s)g and P (s; es) < maxfA(s; es); B(s); Q(s)g. First, by subtracting (1) from (3)
it can be see that P (s; es) A(s; es) = s  R 0 as s R  . Therefore, ss rst choice is a match
in A, while ess would be one in P. Now, there are two cases to consider for s. Either she is
in a mixing situation with es [implying K(s; es) = 1] or she is refusing a promiscuous match
all together [K(s; es) = 0]. Take the latter situation rst. The conjecture is that todays
value functions will immediately jump to their steady values and remain there. This would
imply that L(s; es) = 1, X(s; es) = 1, Y (s; es) = 0. Using this on the righthand sides of (1)
and (2) and solving for A(s; es) and B(s) results in
A(s; es) = A(s); [for s  sd < sd+1  es and X(s; es) = 1]
and
B(s) = B(s); (for s  sd),
where A(s) and B(s) are specied by (28) and (29). Imposing this conjecture on (4) leads
to
Q(s) = v + 
nX
k=d+1
$k[X(s; esk)A(s; esk) + Y (s; esk)P (s; esk)]
+(1  )B(s)
< B(s) < A(s) (for s  sd < sd+1  es):
Thus, s will remain happy with her lot in A, so there is no need to change her strategy
today, taking as given ess strategy.
Next, consider the mixing situation for s. Here, the solution for A(s; es) reads
A(s; es) = u+ (1  )(s   )=2 + B(s)
1  (1  ) < A
(s) [for s  sd < es and X(s; es) = 1=2]:
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For s to agree to a mixing situation it must transpire that A(s; es) > B(s). Observe that
A(s; es) is increasing in s. Thus, mixing cannot occur for any s < sp where p = argmax
j
fj :
A(sj; es) < B(sj)g. When s > sp, there will be no incentive for s to switch strategies.
Now, move to person es. For es to be matched with s it must happen that A(es; s) >
maxfB(es); Q(es)g. Person es may nd himself in one of two situations: either a mixing
situation or one where s will refuse a promiscuous match. In the former K(s; es) = 1, while
in the latter K(s; es) = 0. Take the latter case and suppose that the steady-state solution
holds true at some point in time. Here, then X(s; es) = 1 and Y (s; es) = 0. It is then easy to
deduce that A(es; s) and B(es) are given by
A(es; s) = u+ (1  )A(es; s) + Q(es)
=
u+ Q(es)
1  (1  ) > A
(es) [for s  sd < sd+1  es and X(s; es) = 1];
and
B(es) = v +  dX
i=1
i[X(es; si)A(es; si) + Y (es; si)P (es; si)]
+(1  )Q(es)
< Q(es) < P (es) (for sd+1  es).
[Note that P (es; si) > A(es; si) for es and 0  X(es; si) + Y (es; si)  1:] Now, an abstinent
match cannot occur for any es > sq where q = argmax
j
fj : A(esj; s) > Q(esj)g. When this
is true, there is no incentive for es to shift from the conjectured strategy. Similarly, it is
straightforward to calculate that when there is mixing
A(es; s) = u+ (1  )(es   )=2 + Q(es)
1  (1  ) > A
(es) [for s  sd < sd+1  es and X(s; es) = 1=2]:
As can be seen, mixing will yield es a higher level of utility than a purely abstinent match
when es >  . Mixing cannot occur for any es > sr where r = argmax
j
fj : A(esj; s) > Q(esj)g.
Individual es will have no incentive to deviate from the conjectured strategy when this is
true.
The situation described in Point 4 can be analyzed in a similar manner. The reader is
spared the details.
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13.3 Markov Chain for the Number of Partners
Using (22) and (23) set up a Markov chain as follows:26666666666666666664
m0t+1
u0t+1
m1t+1
u1t+1
...
N 1t+1
mNt+1
uNt+1
37777777777777777775
=
26666666666666666664
(1  ) 0 0 0    0 0 0
 (1  ) 0 0 0 0 0
0  (1  ) 0 0 0 0
0 0  (1  ) 0 0 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
   1  
0 0 0 0  (1  ) 0
0 0 0 0     (1  )
37777777777777777775
26666666666666666664
m0t
u0t
m1t
u1t
...
N 1t
mNt
uNt
37777777777777777775
;
which can be represent more compactly by
pt+1 = Ppt:
Note that
pt+1 = P
t+1p0;
where
pt+1 =
26666666664
pt+1;1
pt+1;2
pt+1;3
...
pt+1;2N+2
37777777775
and p0 =
26666666664
p0;1
p0;2
p0;3
...
p0;2N+2
37777777775
=
26666666664
0
1
0
...
0
37777777775
:
Hence, the mean number of sexual encounters for the experienced isPN+2 1
j=1 (pN;2j+1 + pN;2j+2)jPN+2
j=2 pN;j
:
13.4 Algorithm
The algorithm computes a transition path between two steady states. Pick a time horizon
T su¢ ciently large so that the economy will have converged to the nal steady state by
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this time. Set the period T value functions and type distributions to their nal steady-
state values. Likewise, x the period-1 type distributions at their values in the initial state.
Finally, pick the f tgTt=1 sequence so that the rst 4 (2002  1900) values match the time
series properties observed for the e¤ectiveness of contraception in the U.S. data. Set the
last T   4 (2002  1900) values equal to the number observed for 2002, which amounts to
assuming that there is no technological progress in contraception after this year.
1. Enter iteration j + 1 with a guess from the previous iteration for the time path of
M;N; U and V , denoted by fM jt gT 1t=2 ; fN jt gT 1t=2 ; fU jt gT 1t=2 and fV jt gT 1t=2 .
2. Solve the recursions (1) to (4) using this guess. Retrieve the time path for the pol-
icy functions associated with these recursions represented by fHj+1t gT 1t=1 ,fIj+1t gT 1t=1 ,
fJ j+1t gT 1t=1 ,fKj+1t gT 1t=1 , fLj+1t gT 1t=1 , fXj+1t gT 1t=1 ,fY j+1t gT 1t=1 , and fZj+1t gT 1t=1 . These are
specied by (5) to (12).
3. Calculate new time paths for M;N; U and V , or fM j+1t gT 1t=2 , fN j+1t gT 1t=2 , fU j+1t gT 1t=2
and fV j+1t gT 1t=2 , using the laws of motion (13) to (16).
4. Check for convergence.
(a) If norm(fM j+1t ; N j+1t ; U j+1t ; V j+1t gT 1t=2  fM jt ; N jt ; U jt ; V jt gT 1t=2 ) < " then stop, since
a solution has been found.
(b) If not, then repeat Step 1 using fM j+1t gT 1t=2 , fN j+1t gT 1t=2 , fU j+1t gT 1t=2 and fV j+1t gT 1t=2
for the new guess.
13.5 Data Sources
 Figure 1 premarital sex: For 1900, 1924 and 1934, the numbers are computed from
Kinsey et al. (1953, Table 83, p. 339); for 1958, 1961, 1965, 1971, 1976, 1979, and
1982, the data is derived from Ho¤rett, Kahn and Baldwin (1987, Tables 2 and 3, pp.
48-49); for 1988 and 1995, see Abma and Sonenstein (2001, Table 1, p. 28); for 2002,
the fraction of 19 year-old females with premarital sexual experience was obtained via
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private correspondence with Joyce Abma (Division of Vital Statistics, National Center
for Health Statistics). The data for 1900, 1924, and 1934 are for white females.
 Figure 2 attitudes by women toward premarital sex: The data are displayed in Figure
2 in Harding and Jencks (2003) and was kindly supplied by the authors.
 Figure 3 number of partners: Laudmann et al. (1994, Table 5.5, p. 198).
 Figure 4 out-of-wedlock births: For 1920 and 1930, see Cutright (1972, Table 1, p.
383), and for the data between 1940 and 1999, see Ventura and Bachrach (2000).
 Table 1  contraception use at rst premarital intercourse: For the years 1960-64,
see Mosher and Bachrach (1987, Table 2, p. 87); for 1965-1988, the numbers are
taken from Mosher and McNally (1991, Table 1, p. 110); for 1985-1995, the data are
contained in Abma et al. (1997, Table 39, p. 49); for 1990-2002, the numbers are taken
Mosher et al. (2004). In Mosher et al. (2004), the percentage of users for each method
counts the users of multiple methods. Thus, the sum across di¤erent methods is more
than the total fraction who use any method. In Table 1 their percentage distribution
across di¤erent methods is normalized to sum up to the total fraction who use any
method. The othermethods category includes the use of diaphragms, cervical caps,
IUDs, vaginal spermicides (such as foams, jellies, creams and sponges), the rhythm
method, and injections and implants which were introduced in 1990s. The results are
almost identical if instead for 1900 the 4.2 percent of females in the pill category are
distributed among the no-use, condom, withdrawal and other categories according to
these methodsrelative shares in the 1960-64 period (as opposed to just being placed
in the other category).
 Table 2  failure rates for condoms, the pill, withdrawal, and other methods: (i) For
the period prior to 1960, see the discussion in Section 8.2. (ii) For the period 1960
to 2002 the sources are more varied. Hatcher et al. (1976, 1980) report a 15 to 20
percent failure rate of condoms for typical users. Given the 10 to 20 percent failure
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rates given by Tietze (1970), it is safe to set a 17.5 percent failure rate in Table 2 for the
1960-1982 period. Hatcher et al. (1984, 1988) present 10, and 12 percent failure rates,
respectively. Accordingly, an average value of 11 percent is selected for the 1983-1989
period. Finally, Hatcher et al (1998 and 2004) list 14 and 15 percent failure rates. For
the 1990-2002 period the average value of 14.5 percent is used. Hatcher et al. (1976,
1980) give 5 to 10 percent and 10 percent failure rates for the typical use of the pill.
Therefore, set the failure rate at 7.5 percent for the 1960 to 1982 period. Hatcher et
al. (1984, 1988) present much lower failure rates of 2 and 4.7 percent. Accordingly, set
the e¤ectiveness for the 1983-1989 period to the average value of 3.35 percent. Finally,
for the 1990-2002 period average the 3 percent failure rate reported by Hatcher et al.
(1998) and Kelly (2001) and the 8 percent failure rate given by Hatcher et al. (2004).
The numbers for withdrawal are again based on the estimates of Hatcher et al. (1976,
1980) who give 20 to 25 percent failure rates. The numbers for 1983-95 are based on
Hatcher et al. (1984, 1989), who report 23 and 18 percent failure rates, while those for
the 1995-2002 period derive from Hatcher et al (1998 and 2004) who present 19 and 27
percent failure rates. Finally, given the small number of people using other methods
the results are not very sensitive to the assumption made regarding their e¤ectiveness.
A simple assumption is made here that the failure rate for all other methods between
1960 and 1988 was about 20 percent, and then declined to 10 percent. According to
Hatcher et al. (1976, 1980, 1984, 1988, 1998, and 2004) the failure rate of the IUD
was about 6 to 10 percent in 1976, declined to about 5 percent in the 1980s, and
nally reached 3 percent by 2004. The failure rate for the diaphragm was about 20
to 25 percent in 1976, and remained pretty much constant until recently. It had a 16
percent failure rate in 2004. The same is also true for many vaginal spermicides (foams,
jellies, sponges, etc.) that had about 20 to 30 percent failure rates during this entire
period. Injections and implants, two very e¤ective contraceptives, were introduced in
the 1990s  see FDA (1997).
 Figure 9  teenage pregnancies: Henshaw (2004 Table 1, p. 1) reports the number of
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births, abortions, and miscarriages (the latter calculated as 20 percent of births plus 10
percent of abortions) for all teenager girls for the 1972-2000 period. To calculate the
number of pregnancies for unmarried teenager girls, the number births and abortions
for unmarried teenagers are needed. The number of abortions, however, is only avail-
able for all teenagers, and just for the post-1972 period. Hence, certain assumptions
are made to generate a pregnancy series for unmarried teenagers. In Figure 9 two such
series for the 1960-2000 period are plotted. The rst series, the lower estimate, is cal-
culated in the following manner. Tietze (1983, Table 2, p. 33) reports an abortions-to-
births ratio for all women for the years 1963-1972. Assuming that this ratio declined at
the same rate for teenagers as it did for all women, one can extend the Henshaw (2004)
abortion numbers back to 1963. Suppose there were no abortions between 1960 and
1963. Then, the total number of pregnancies to unmarried teenagers can be calculated
as the number of births plus abortions plus miscarriages. Here the number of births is
taken from Ventura and Bachrach (2000, Table 2, p. 18) and Ventura, Mathews and
Hamilton (2001, Table 1, p. 10). The number of abortions to unmarried teenagers
is calculated as the (number of abortions to all teenagers)(out-of-wedlock births to
teenagers)/(births to all teenagers). Last, the number of miscarriages is computed as
20 percent of births plus 10 percent of abortions. The second series makes a much
simpler calculation. For the 1972-2000 period it sums births to unmarried teenagers,
all abortions to teenagers, and miscarriages (calculated as 20 percent of births plus 10
percent of abortions). For the 1960-1971 period it estimates the total number pregnan-
cies by simply assuming that the (abortions + miscarriages)/(out-of-wedlock births)
ratio took the same value as it did in 1972.
 Table 3 number of partners: The source is Abma et al. (2004, Table 13, p. 26).
When calculating the mean number of partners from this data a value of 8 is assigned
for the 7+ category.
 Figure 11  abortion and HIV: The sources for the abortion numbers presented in
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this gure are discussed in the data sources for Figure 9 above. The total population
living with HIV/AIDS for the 1978-2000 period is taken from Holtgrave (2003). For
the years 2001 and 2002 the numbers come from the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (2002). Numbers on the fraction of teenagers with HIV/AIDS might be
more appropriate. Calculating this would require making a lot of assumptions, though,
since HIV/ AIDS statistics are not readily available by narrow age groups, except for
recent years. The results were not much di¤erent when a series for teenagers living
with HIV/AIDS was constructed.
 Table 4 e¤ectiveness of contraception against HIV: See the discussion in Section 10.4.
 Table 5  frequency of sex: Abma et al. (2004, Table 6, p. 21) provide numbers
for the frequency of sex for females aged 15-19 for the year 2002. Table 5 converts
their numbers so that they apply to sexually experienced girls. Specically, Abma
et al. (2004) report that only 45.5 percent of girls had experienced sex. So, their
numbers for the non-zero frequencies are scaled up by 1/0.455. The number for the
zero frequency in Table 5 is then simply taken to be one minus the sum over the non-
zero frequencies. The numbers in parenthesis in Table 5 present the data points used
to tabulate the mean.
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